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professional military education on this





Stavridis, James. Destroyer Captain: Lessons of a
First Command. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute
Press, 2008. 224pp. $22.95
The politically correct aspiration for all
surface warfare officers is to attain to
command at sea. Realistically, these of-
ficers cannot begin to comprehend all
its ramifications, but they viscerally
know it is the Holy Grail. Reading Ad-
miral Jim Stavridis’s Destroyer Captain
is about as close as these officers will
come to enjoying the ride until they ac-
tually receive their orders to command.
It is our great fortune that then-
commander Stavridis scrupulously kept
a journal during his days aboard USS
Barry (DDG 52) (1993–95) and has of-
fered to share his experiences with us.
James Stavridis is prolific on this sub-
ject, having written extensively on life at
sea for the naval professional. Such ear-
lier works as Watch Officer’s Guide (edi-
tor, 1999) and Command at Sea (with
William Mack, 1999) now serve as text-
books. Destroyer Captain, however, is
designed to be a good read for anyone
fascinated with what life is like behind
the doors of the captain’s cabin. Fortu-
nately, Stavridis is a writer who is not
only good with the small details of daily
life but shares a sense of history and
awe of the sea. Simply, he is in love with
command at sea, and you feel it
throughout the entire book.
Stavridis does not purport to tell new
destroyer skippers that there is one cor-
rect way to succeed at their job, but he
has tried to keep to the basics. The
“ends” are mandated: the ship should
be ready for war. The “means” is where
a captain’s personality turns seemingly
identical structures into radically differ-
ent habitats. Stavridis adheres to sim-
plicity. Serve good food. Walk around.
Have a plan. Smile.
Stavridis, currently the regional com-
batant commander of Southern Com-
mand, was the second skipper of Barry.
His predecessor, today Admiral Gary
Roughead, is the Chief of Naval
Operations.
A particularly poignant piece is his ac-
count of the tragic death of Admiral Jay
Prout, a friend and mentor and always
an ebullient companion. Prout had a
trademark of passing to friends en route
to command a paperback about the ex-
ploits of a Royal Navy destroyer skipper
who had three ships shot out from un-
der him during the Second World War.
He called that book motivation for a
successful command. We can place De-
stroyer Captain on the same list.
TOM FEDYSZYN
Naval War College
Cliff, Roger, et al. Entering the Dragon’s Lair: Chi-
nese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications
for the United States. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND,
2007. 154pp. $27.50
This study has already attracted wide-
spread attention from the policy com-
munity and media, for good reason.
The U.S. military appears poised to face
challenges to its ability to maintain ac-
cess to a variety of regional littoral
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areas, such as in the Persian Gulf. It is
time for American planners to view the
rising antiaccess challenge as part of a
global problem that may require signifi-
cant restructuring of U.S. platforms,
deployment, diplomacy, and even, in a
worst case, strategy and tactics.
The authors have produced the first
major study that evaluates comprehen-
sively the specific antiaccess methods
being discussed by Chinese military
strategists. They bring to bear a wide
variety of relevant doctrinal and ana-
lytic materials (many of which they
themselves have translated) and explain
clearly their relative authority. The au-
thors’ conclusion is sobering: in the un-
fortunate event of a Taiwan Strait
conflict, China’s military may consider
launching a rapid surprise attack. Such
a first strike could damage and render
ineffective a wide variety of U.S. mili-
tary platforms (aircraft carrier strike
groups—which are described as having
special vulnerabilities—and assets at re-
gional bases). This could deny U.S.
forces effective “access” to sea and air
space to China’s east, leaving Taiwan
vulnerable to military coercion and
testing American resolve. The authors
term this growing zone “the Dragon’s
Lair.” While the United States would
retain significant military forces regard-
less of the outcome of such a conflict,
China might be able to achieve specific
military and political objectives at
America’s expense.
An enduring challenge for analyses of
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is
distinguishing between aspirations and
capabilities. The authors do their best
to differentiate between the two, and
they deserve great credit for addressing
seriously a set of issues on which there
has been insufficient open analysis.
While the continued lack of transpar-
ency makes it difficult to determine the
PLA’s precise capabilities, long-
established technical expertise and fo-
cus on the development of such weap-
ons as missiles and related technologies
suggest considerable potential on
China’s part. The authors offer, in light
of their findings, a wide variety of spe-
cific policy recommendations, which
should be considered carefully. How-
ever, the expense, difficulties (largely
because of inherent physics-based limi-
tations), and side effects potentially as-
sociated with some of them—and
indeed the ruinous nature of any
U.S.-China conflict—make it vital to
consider the larger strategic context as
well.
Conflict over Taiwan is the only readily
imaginable scenario in which the
United States and China could have a
kinetic military exchange today. This
unfortunate contingency, already only a
remote one, has been rendered more so
by the March 2008 Taiwan election and
President Ma Ying-jeou’s constructive
approach to cross-strait relations. Con-
tinued U.S. presence and influence in
strategic regions of East Asia, which
Beijing has not challenged directly in
public, will remain an important sub-
ject for American policy makers, as well
as for bilateral and multilateral discus-
sion. Even as the two nations cooperate,
there will undoubtedly be areas of con-
tention. But there is no reason at this
point to fear that war is imminent, and
every reason to believe that each side’s
coercive capabilities can deter the out-
come that each most fears.
ANDREW ERICKSON
Naval War College
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